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Abstract—Smart grid is the nexus of advanced Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT) and legacy power 
systems. With increasing awareness on vulnerabilities of smart 
grids to cyber-attacks, cybersecurity is becoming a prime 
concern. Earlier, it was assumed that power system 
communication protocols are very specialized and different, so 
the “security by obscurity” approach would be sufficient. 
However, with the standardization of communication protocols 
for power utilities and emergence of power market, this approach 
is no longer valid. IEC 62351 standard has been published to 
provide security recommendations for different power system 
communication protocols including IEC 61850. IEC 61850 is 
emerging as the most promising and popular power system 
communication standard. Therefore, in this paper, a detail 
analysis of security threats, possible attacks and security 
requirements for IEC 61850 communication is presented. 
Building on this, the security considerations presented in IEC 
62351 for securing different IEC 61850 messages such as Generic 
Object-Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE), Sampled Values 
(SV), Routable-GOOSE (R-GOOSE), Routable-SV (R-SV) and 
Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) messages have 
been presented in great detail. 
 
Index Terms—IEC 61850, IEC 62351, Security requirements, 
Cyber Physical Systems, Cybersecurity, Availability, 
Confidentiality, Message Integrity, GOOSE. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE traditional power system concept is evolving into 
smart grid with the integration of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT). The application of 
advanced ICT in power system domain enables greater control 
and operation with smaller margins. All these schemes require 
some sort of communication and coordination between 
different components of the power grid. This communication 
needs to take place between equipment that are manufactured 
by a myriad of companies that pertain to different domains. 
For this reason, many efforts have been made to develop 
different communication technologies, standards and protocols 
for smart grids [1].  
Advancements in ICT technologies with lower latencies and 
higher bandwidth has propelled the automation of smart grids. 
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Different standards and protocols were developed for 
standardizing the communication in smart grids. The 
communication standards and protocols define how the 
information is exchanged between different components such 
as field equipment, controller Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs) and servers. Although initially proposed for substation 
automation only, IEC 61850 standard has emerged as the most 
promising communication standard for smart grids [2]. This is 
thanks to its object-oriented design which serves for 
interoperable operation between instruments from different 
vendors. It has the ability to design new smart grid 
components and report several data sets at the same time [3]–
[5]. With all these capabilities, IEC 61850 is poised to be the 
smart grid communication standard of the future [6], [7]. The 
evolution of IEC 61850 from substation to power utility 
domain has increased the concerns for the cyberattacks [8]. 
This stems from the fact that, in the past, much attention 
was paid to improve the performance of the communication 
protocols and achieve interoperability between different 
equipment. Cybersecurity was not really a hot research topic. 
This is because the communication protocols for the power 
system were considered to be very specialized and different. 
Hence, knowledge of how to read the bits and bytes of the 
appropriate one-out-of-a hundred communication protocols 
was considered to be challenging and obscure. Therefore, it 
was assumed that the “security by obscurity” approach would 
be sufficient [9]. Furthermore, the data exchanged in these 
communications, such as voltage measurements of a power 
line, is not considered to be as valuable as financial 
information. 
However, with the changing paradigms in power system 
communications, the concept of “security by obscurity” is no 
longer valid. There are several reasons behind this; with the 
standardization of the communication protocols and 
interoperability, information models became uniform without 
any obscurity. Secondly, in addition to power system 
measurements, financial information is exchanged in power 
system communications. For instance, in deregulated 
electricity markets, tiny misinformation about the power 
information can lead to disruption of bids in highly 
competitive electricity markets for example European Power 
Exchange (EPEX) issue in June 2019 [10]. Lastly, with the 
integration of wide-area power networks with known 
information models and messages, power system 
infrastructure has become, at least in theory, a possible target 
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for cyber-attacks. This possibility is really broad, as 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 62351 
standard puts it: And the desire to disrupt power system 
operations can stem from simple teenager bravado to 
competitive game-playing in the electrical market place to 
actual terrorism [9]. 
Therefore, a complete end-to-end security model for power 
system communication is required. IEC Technical Committee 
(TC) 57 WG 15 developed IEC 62351 standard series which 
addresses the cybersecurity issues of the power 
communication standards that are under the jurisdiction of TC 
57. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities of IEC 61850 
communication and the recommended schemes to mitigates 
those are also discussed in this new standard, IEC 62351 [9]. 
This document is a list of guidelines and develops a 
framework for secure operation. However, its implementation 
in actual operation scenarios, such as over-current relay 
coordination, or distributed energy resources management 
system, is open to interpretation. In order to implement 
cybersecurity measures in smart grids that are modeled 
according to IEC 61850, a thorough study of IEC 62351 
standard is required. After that, individual solutions can be 
developed to ensure secure communication in different fields 
of smart grid operation 
Standard development is a hard task as the standards are 
intended to be inclusive of all technologies and not to favor 
one over the other. For this reason, they are developed as a set 
of guidelines or a framework to achieve a certain goal. 
Specific implementations, their performances and technology 
selection are not discussed. It is up to the user, to study the 
standard, understand its stipulations and develop a practical 
solution that both meets technical needs of the operation and 
the requirements of the standard.  
It is important to have a thorough understanding of IEC 
61850 messages, their vulnerabilities and the cybersecurity 
guidelines of IEC 62351. To this end, in this paper the 
cybersecurity recommendations by IEC 62351 standard parts 
(especially part 4 and 6) for different IEC 61850 message 
protocols such as Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events 
(GOOSE), Sampled Values (SV), Routable-GOOSE (R-
GOOSE), Routable-SV (R-SV) and Manufacturing Message 
Specification (MMS) are analyzed in detail. Differences in the 
structures of these messages as well as their uses cases are 
discussed. Based on this background, relevant cybersecurity 
schemes, how they mitigate these vulnerabilities and practical 
implementation considerations are discussed.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II gives 
an overall background of IEC 61850. Section III presents the 
security requirements, challenges and potential attacks in IEC 
61850-based power utility automation systems. Section IV 
presents an overview of IEC 62351 standard. Section V 
discusses IEC 62351 security considerations for different IEC 
61850 messages. Finally, Section VI draws the conclusions. 
II. IEC 61850 BACKGROUND 
The first edition of IEC 61850 standard series had 10 main 
parts [11]. The Table I gives the brief description of different 
parts of IEC 61850 standard for Substation Automation 
System (SAS). The main strength of IEC 61850 standard is the 
common data model it uses for devices and its unique message 
protocols for communicating power system information in a 
predefined fashion. These two features, which are discussed 
below in detail, enable interoperability in smart grids and pave 
the way for plug-and-play (PnP) capability. 
 
TABLE I 
DESCRIPTION OF IEC 61850 STANDARD PARTS FOR SUBSTATION 
AUTOMATION SYSTEMS (SAS) 
Parts Description 
IEC 61850-1 Introduction and overview 
IEC 61850-2 Glossary 
IEC 61850-3 General requirements 
IEC 61850-4 Specifies the system and project management for 
power utility automation systems with communication 
between IEDs. 
IEC 61850-5 [11] Specifies information on communication requirements 
of substation automation functions. 
IEC 61850-6 [12] Specifies a description language for the configuration 
of IEDs in SAS called System Configuration 
description Language (SCL) 
IEC 61850-7-1 [13] Presents detailed account of Abstract Communication 
Service Interface (ACSI), different Logical Nodes 
(LNs), Data Objects (DOs), Common Data Classes 
(CDCs) and how to achieve interoperability using 
these building blocks. 
IEC 61850-7-2 [14] 
IEC 61850-7-3 [15] 
IEC 61850-7-4 [16] 
IEC 61850-8-1 [17] Parts specify the protocol structure and mapping of 
different ACSI services to MMS, eXtensible Markup 
Language (XML) messages transported over 
eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) 
and ISO/IEC 8802-3 (Ethernet). 
IEC 61850-8-2 [18] 
IEC 61850-9-2 [19] 
IEC 61850-9-3 [20] Specifies a precision time protocol (PTP) profile of 
IEEE 1588-2008 in compliance with IEC 61850. 
IEC 61850-10 [21] Specifies procedure for conformance testing of 61850 
client, server and engineering tools. 
A. IEC 61850 for power utility automation beyond SAS 
Considering the popularity of IEC 61850 [22] and its 
capability to exchange high volume of data in a standardized 
and interoperable manner, researchers and engineers started 
thinking about using it beyond SAS implementations. Several 
extension publications, such as 7-420 for distributed energy 
resources (DERs), IEC 61850 evolved from a SAS standard 
into a communication standard that covers entire power utility 
automation. IEC 61850-7-420 [23] published in 2009 presents 
the information modeling for different DERs in terms of 
Logical Nodes (LNs). Using these IEC 61850-7-420 
information models of DERs, different researchers developed 
communication assisted protection schemes for active 
distribution systems and microgrids with high penetration of 
DERs [24]–[29]. Furthermore, IEC 61850-7-420 
communication based functions/applications for smart grids 
and microgrids have been extensively studied and reported; 
such as energy management [30], [31], active and reactive 
power control [4], [32], [33], automation [34]–[36], multi-
agent management [37]–[39], control and optimization [40], 
Electric Vehicle (EV)- Photovoltaic (PV) coordination [41]. 
Similarly, the IEC 61850-7-420 information models were used 
to develop communication framework for virtual power plant 
management [42], [43], battery energy storage system [44] as 
well as smart meters and solar home systems [5]. 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
3 
IEC 61850-90-1 [45] and IEC 61850-90-2 [46] extensions 
present comprehensive overview of the different aspects that 
need to be considered for inter-substation and substation to 
control center communication, respectively. For inter-
substation information exchange over a Wide Area Network 
(WAN), IEC 61850-90-1 specifies either mapping of GOOSE 
and SV messages over TCP/IP layers (but using UDP at the 
transport layer) or tunneling them across WAN. Using these 
techniques exchanging GOOSE and SV in a WAN different 
protection schemes requiring inter-substation communication, 
such as differential and distance protection, were developed 
[47]–[49]. 
IEC 61850-90-5 [50] provides guidelines for IEEE 
C37.118.1 [51] based synchrophasor data transfer as per IEC 
61850. The LN MMXU was augmented with new Data 
Objects (DOs), e.g. “HzRte” and “ClcIntvPer”, to incorporate 
the synchrophasor measurement parameters such as Rate of 
Change of Frequency (ROCOF) and sampling rate. 
Additionally, IEEE C37.118.2 [52] PMU information 
exchanges were replaced by R-GOOSE and R-SV messages. 
The layer 2 GOOSE and SV messages are mapped over 
UDP/IP layers to form the R-GOOSE and R-SV messages, as 
shown in Fig. 1. In [53], [54] authors developed and 
implemented R-GOOSE and R-SV gateways for 
synchrophasor communication. In [55] the performance of the 
IEC 61850-90-5 PMU communication networks in 
comparison to IEEE C37.118.2 communication networks is 
presented. Similarly, the IEC 61850-90-7 [56] extension 




Fig. 1. R-GOOSE and R-SV protocol stack. 
 
Authors in [3], developed information model for EVs by 
extending the IEC 61850-7-420 to develop a new LN EVCT. 
Later in 2016, IEC 61850-90-8 [57] extension specifying the 
object models for EV and its related equipment was published. 
It gives an information model for EV and its related 
equipment for PnP integration of EVs to the grid. Utilizing the 
IEC 61850-90-8 information models, communication-based 
energy management strategy in microgrids with high 
penetration of EVs is developed in [58]. In [59], a charging 
management strategy of EVs based on harmonization of IEEE 
WAVE 1609 and IEC 61850-90-8 communication has been 
presented. IEC 61850-90-8 information model of EV only 
supports the charging process. In [58], IEC 61850-90-8 LNs 
for EV were extended by including new DOs to support the 
discharging process.  
From the above non-exhaustive survey, it is quite evident 
that IEC 61850 is growing fast and poised to become the 
popular and preferred standard for power utility automation. 
The evolution of IEC 61850 from substation to power utility 
domain has increased the concerns for the cyberattacks. With 
the standardization of the power communication exchanges 
and extending IEC 61850-based communication to WANs and 
to carry sensitive information such as electricity market 
transactions, the notion of “security by obscurity” no longer 
holds valid. A thorough cybersecurity refurbishment is 
required to keep up with IEC 61850’s popularity and 
extensions for alternative use. 
III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, CHALLENGES AND ATTACKS IN 
IEC 61850 POWER UTILITY AUTOMATION SYSTEMS 
The security challenges for power utility automation 
systems largely differs to those of internet systems. All the 
existing security services and technologies are primarily 
developed for the computer internet, whose requirements are 
completely different from the power system.  
Generally, the communication channels used for power 
system communication are narrow band with throughput 
constraints, hence the security measures resulting is additional 
overheads such as key exchanges, digital signatures etc. 
Further, the power communication equipment such as 
controllers are limited by processing powers and memory, 
hence security measures such as encryption etc. becomes very 
difficult. Majority of these devices and systems have no access 
to Internet and are located in remote sites with no on-site 
personnel. All of these factors make it challenging to manage 
keys, revoke certificates or implement other security 
measures. 
The communication in power utility automation system 
carries critical information related to direct actions in physical 
world, any hindrance in accessing any one component may 
lead to catastrophic effects. Hence, the denial of service to 
authorized entity in power utility automation systems is much 
more severe than normal internet systems.  
Hence, there is a potential requirement of either developing 
new services and technologies or modifying the existing 
security services and technologies of internet to adhere to the 
security and communication requirements of power utility 
automation systems. 
A. Basic security requirements, potential threats and possible 
attacks 
The four basic security requirements in any system for 
preventing four basic security threats are: 1) Confidentiality – 
prevention of unauthorized access to information; 2) Integrity 
– prevention of any modification or theft of information; 3) 
Availability – preventing denial of service and availability of 
information to authorized users; 4) Non-repudiation – 
preventing the denial of an action that took place or claim of 
an action that did not take place [60].  
The required security countermeasures largely differ for 
each system and, also, depend on time performance. 
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Therefore, identifying the required countermeasures beneficial 
to meet the security requirements is an important task. It is 
generally desired to have an optimal solution with adequate 
appropriate measures and no overkill. The security problem 
has been clearly explained in IEC 62351 [9] as follows: 
Security represents a collection of issues that are hugely 
sophisticated and spread over different dimensions. Security 
field cannot be disintegrated into smaller, more manageable 
portions in a standard and clear way. This makes it, virtually, 
impossible to survey and deploy full security measures in a 
cost-effective way. 
B. Review of security attacks in IEC 61850 power utility 
automation systems 
IEC 61850’s popularity can be attributed to two main 
factors: ease of connection via ethernet instead of traditional 
hard-wired systems and standardized message structures 
which ensures interoperability. An unwanted consequence of 
these is the increased vulnerability to cyber-attacks. It is easier 
to access ethernet-based networks and standardized messages 
allow hackers to know exactly what instructions to give. 
The attacks on IEC 61850 based substations are carried out 
usually to achieve these goals: 
1. Disrupt the services in substation by modifying and 
fabricating the information/data exchanges or  
2. Gaining access to confidential information.  
Different attacks on substation communication network are 
carried out targeting a specific protocol or device/node. In 
[61], [62] authors showcased the malicious Fault Injection 
Attack (FIA) and false data injection on target IEDs by 
injecting computation errors through invasive or noninvasive 
techniques. Further, the impact on substation security and, 
eventually, power grid integrity and availability are discussed. 
In [63] authors developed a scheme to audit the security of 
IEC 61850 automated substation. The audit scheme consists of 
security metrics which quantify the security of the network. 
From the security audit, it was concluded that intrusion attacks 
were most common and an intrusion detection system must be 
employed as a viable security countermeasure. 
Cyber intrusion attacks on IEC 61850 GOOSE and SV 
messages are discussed in [64]. The intruders can modify 
GOOSE messages and trip circuit breakers in substations. 
With SV messages, an intruder can send fabricated values to 
control centers which can lead to false conclusions and 
operational decisions.  
Every GOOSE message contains two parameters, status 
number (stNum) and sequence number (sqNum). For every 
GOOSE message published, the sqNum value is incremented 
by one, while stNum value is updated with a new event. Fig. 2 
shows how sqNum and stNum values change with periodic 
publication and an event. With the event, stNum is 
incremented to 2 and sqNum is initialized to zero.  
In [65] authors describe about three types of attacks on 
GOOSE messages called GOOSE poisoning. First one is the 
high-status number attack where spoofed GOOSE messages 
with high stNum are sent by a hacker. The subscriber, after 
processing these spoofed GOOSE messages, discard the other 
legitimate GOOSE messages with stNum equal to or less than 
that of spoofed messages. Figure 3 shows that when the 
subscriber receives the spoofed GOOSE message with stNum 
value 2, it rejects legitimate GOOSE messages with stNum 
value 1. Second one is high rate flooding attack. In this case, 
several spoofed GOOSE messages are sent as multicast 
messages while status figures (i.e. stNum) are increased. This 
causes the subscriber to expect a very high stNum value for the 
next GOOSE message. This type of attack is summarized as 
status number flooding attack. 
 




















































Fig. 3. GOOSE message attach with spoofed status number (stNum).  
 
The last one is called semantic attack. This type of attack is 
carried out in two phases. In the first phase, the attacker 
observes the network traffic and determines the rate of status 
change. In second phase, attacker multicasts spoofed GOOSE 
messages with a different rate. These spoofed GOOSE 
messages prevent subscriber from processing the legitimate 
GOOSE message. Similar replay and tampering attacks on 
GOOSE and SV messages are discussed in the literature [66]–
[68]. The consequences of masquerade and replay attacks on 
power system operation are discussed in [66].  
An integrated Anomaly Detection System (ADS) was 
proposed in [69] to prevent intruders gaining access to SAS. 
Similarly, in [70] an intrusion detection system based on data 
collected from simulated attacks on IEDs. However, still these 
detection systems do not fulfill the authenticity and message 
integrity security requirements and hence are prone to 
intrusion attacks. Node authentication of all the entities in the 
network solves the problem of network intrusions [71]. 
In [72] authors, demonstrated Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) 
attack on IEC 61850 MMS messages by ARP spoofing. Based 
on this MITM attack, the attacker may further launch series of 
new attacks such as eavesdropping, masquerade, false data 
injection, replay and DoS. SYN flood attacks and buffer 
overflow attacks as a DoS attack are showcased in [73]. 
Review of cybersecurity attacks, challenges and measures for 
IEC 61850 message exchanges is presented in [74]–[76]. 
Table II provides summary of different types of security 
attacks and the security requirements in IEC 61850 automated 
systems.  
Figure 4 shows the security requirements, and different 
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security threats and security attacks pertaining to different IEC 
61850 messages. Different types of attacks that lead to 
different security threats which compromise security 
requirements are shown in Fig. 4. It can be noticed that same 
type of attack may be used to realize different security threats. 
In order to achieve end-to-end security, security measures 
must be employed to mitigate all of four threats and the 
corresponding attacks. Mitigating a single threat would not be 
adequate as the same type of attack might be possible for a 
different threat. Hence, all the threats must be addressed at the 
same time in a system. To address cybersecurity concerns in 
IEC 61850-based communication networks, IEC TC 57 
published IEC 62351 standard which is presented below. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Different security threats with their corresponding security attacks. 
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IV. IEC 62351 OVERVIEW 
IEC 62351 standard aims to provide smart grids end-to-end 
cybersecurity measures and solutions for possible attacks. It 
addresses the cybersecurity issues of different IEC TC 57 
power communication standards such as IEC 61850, IEC 
60870-5, IEC 61970, IEC 61968 and IEC 60870-6. Currently, 
the standard has 16 parts, listed as follows: 
• Part 1: Introduction to security issues [9]  
• Part 2: Glossary of terms 
• Part 3: Profiles including TCP/IP [77] 
• Part 4: Profiles including MMS and derivatives [78] 
• Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives 
• Part 6: Security for IEC 61850 [79]  
• Part 7: Network and System Management (NSM) data 
object models [80]  
• Part 8: Role-based access control [81]  
• Part 9: Cyber security key management for power system 
equipment [82]  
• Part 10: Security architecture guidelines 
• Part 11: Security for XML documents 
• Part 12: Resilience and security recommendations for 
power systems with DER cyber-physical systems 
• Part 13: Guidelines on security topics to be covered in 
standards and specifications 
• Part 90-1: Guidelines for handling role-based access 
control in power systems 
• Part 90-2: Deep packet inspection of encrypted 
communications 
• Part 100-1: Conformance test cases for IEC TS 62351-5 
and IEC TS 60870-5-7 
The comprehensive analysis of different parts of IEC 62351 
is made in [83]. It covers analysis of part 1 to 10. However, 
IEC 62351 parts 3 and 4have been completely revised and 
parts 7 and 9 are recently added. A brief overview of these 
revisions is presented below. 
1. IEC 62351-3:2018 
The IEC 62351-3:2018 Ed. 1.1 specifies the cybersecurity 
procedures to achieve confidentiality, integrity, and 
authentication at the transport layer for different SCADA and 
telecontrol protocols that make use of TCP/IP. Among IEC 
61850 messages, this part relates to MMS messaging. 
2. IEC 62351-4:2018: 
IEC 62351-4:2018 specifies security requirements in terms 
of procedures, protocol extensions, and algorithms at the 
transport and application layer for MMS messages and its 
derivatives. IEC 62351-4:2007 provides limited support for 
authentication during handshake and only supports Open 
Systems Interworking (OSI) protocol stack. IEC 62351-4:2018 
was revised to provide more information on extended integrity 
and authentication both for handshake phase and the data 
transfer phase in MMS communication. Furthermore, it 
provides support for application protocols using other protocol 
stacks, e.g. an Internet protocol suite. Currently, the IEC 
62351-4:2018 supports application protocols with OSI and 
eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) stacks. 
3. IEC 62351-7:2017 
IEC 62351-7:2017 defines network and system 
management (NSM) data object models for determining the 
security and reliability of the network. These models would 
help in intrusion detection, monitoring the health and 
condition of the IEDs. This edition has been revised 
technically. Furthermore, NSM object description follows 
UML model principles, a thorough review is performed on 
NSM object data with new data introductions; MIBs 
translation of SNMP protocol is added as Code Components. 
4. IEC 62351-9:2017 
IEC 62351-9 specifies the detailed process of generating, 
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distributing, revoking and handling of public key certificates 
and cryptographic keys. This includes asymmetric and 
symmetric keys that are used in different algorithms specified 
in other parts of IEC 62351 standards such as 3, 4 and 6. 
Specific parts of IEC 62351 deals with the security 
guidelines for securing the IEC 61850 communication. The 
IEC 61850-6 specifies the security mechanisms to secure the 
IEC 61850-8-1 [17] GOOSE and IEC 61850-9-2 SV [19] 
messages, whereas the IEC 62351-4 and 3 provide the security 
mechanisms required to secure the IEC 61850-8-1 MMS 
messages and IEC 61850-8-2 [18] XMPP messages. IEC 
62351-9 contains the cryptographic key management methods 
for the security algorithms specified in IEC 62351-3, 4, and 6 
for securing different IEC 61850 messages. In addition to the 
above discussed security mechanisms, IEC 62351-7 and IEC 
62351-8 provide NSM object model for determining the 
security and reliability of the network and role-based access 
control at application layer common to all types of IEC 61850 
messages. Figure 5 summarizes the security mechanisms 
defined in different parts of IEC 62351 series corresponding to 
the different IEC 61850 messages. 
 
 
Fig. 5. IEC 62351 security mechanisms corresponding to the different IEC 
61850 messages. 
V. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR IEC 61850 MESSAGE 
EXCHANGES  
In this section, security requirements specified by IEC 
62351 standard for different IEC 61850 messages are 
discussed. For ease of understanding, this section is structured 
based on three messages types used in IEC 61850 based 
communication. First category includes GOOSE and SV 
messages which can be unicast and multicast messages that 
are only used within a LAN. Second category includes R-
GOOSE and R-SV messages which are essentially the same as 
first category messages except that they can be routed to 
different LANs and WANs. This extends the operation domain 
considerably and adds more security vulnerabilities. Finally, 
MMS messages are considered which are routable yet used for 
point-to-point communication, not multicast messaging. 
A. GOOSE and SV messages 
IEC 62351-1 identifies message authenticity and integrity as 
two important security requirements for IEC 61850 GOOSE 
and SV messages. Considering that GOOSE messages have a 
strict time delivery requirement of 3 ms, IEC 62351-1 
stipulates that encryption algorithms should not be applied [9]. 
The reasoning is that processing times for encryption of 
GOOSE messages would be high with the limited computation 
capacity of the IEDs. The security threats countered by 
implementation of these security requirements include 
unauthorized modification of data, tampering, replay and 
MITM attacks [9]. To achieve these security requirements, 
IEC 62351-6:2007 standard recommends use of Digital 
Signatures (DS) generated by SHA256 and RSA public key 
algorithms. For DS generation, RSA algorithm as per RFC 
2313 [84] is stipulated. Further, IEC 62351-6:2007 
specifically mentions use of SHA256 algorithm for generating 
HASH values and RSASA-PSS algorithm as per RFC 3447 
[85] for signing the HASH value as long as it is compatible 
with RFC 2313.  
For every GOOSE/SV message, a DS is generated stating 
with the EtherType field through the end of Application 
protocol Data Unit (APDU) field. This generated DS is 
appended to GOOSE/SV message in a new field ‘Extension’ 
as shown in Fig. 6. The length of ‘Extension’ field (i.e. DS) is 
reflected on the 2nd byte of 2-byte “Reserved1” field. Hence, 
the value in 2nd byte of ‘reserved1’ field specifies the length of 
the ‘Extension’ (i.e. DS) appended to the message. 
“Reserved2” field is used to specify 16-bit CRC value, which 
is calculated for first 8 bytes of the GOOSE/SV PDU (i.e. 
‘Ether-type’, ‘APPID’, ‘Length’ and ‘reserved 1’ fields). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Extended GOOSE/SV frame format. 
 
In [86], authors implemented RSA based digital signatures 
as per IEC 62351-6:2007 specifications to mitigate replay and 
masquerade attacks on GOOSE messages. However, many 
shortcomings related to the use of RSA based DS for securing 
GOOSE/SV messages were identified in literature [86]–[91]. 
Table III shows the computational times for signing the DS 
with RSA and ECDSA algorithms reported in literature. From 
Table III it is quite evident that both RSA and ECDSA 
algorithms do not meet the 3 ms timing requirement of 
GOOSE messages [11]. A typical protection IED would be 
required to handle about 4000 packets of SV per second [92] 
and about 100 to 150 GOOSE packets per second [93]. With 
this huge data rate, it is practically impossible to secure the 
GOOSE/SV messages with the DS scheme proposed on IEC 
62351-6:2007 standard. 
TABLE III 

















1024 0.942 0.283 Intel i5-3210M CPU @ 
2.50GHz 
[91] 
2048 3.56 0.75 
RSA 1024 6.8 - Pentium M 1.7 GHz [88] 




1024 4 - Intel Core 2 Duo @ 2.2 
GHz (2 GB RAM) 
1024 3.748  0.155 FPGA (100 MHz) 
1024 1.917 0.129  FPGA (200 MHz) 
RSA 1024 0.3  Xeon server 2.53 GHz  [89] 
1024 >6 - BeagleBone Black 
(TIAM3359 ARM 
Cortex A8 @ 1 GHz) 
1024 >10 - Raspberry Pi 2 with 
BCM2836 quad-core 
ARM Cortex A7 
overclocked at 1 GHz 





320 5.7 7.2  Pentium III at I GHz [94] 
ECDSA FP  320 4.0 5.2 
BLS 𝐹𝐹397 170 3.5 23.0 
 
Alternatively, in [95]–[97] authors proposed use of Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms for GOOSE/SV 
security. IEC 61850-90-5 [50] already stipulates MAC 
algorithms for securing R-GOOSE and R-SV. Hence, the 
MAC algorithms are included in the draft of IEC 62351-
6:2020 standards which will be published in 2020. MAC 
algorithms and their corresponding sizes of MAC values are 
given in Table IV.  
TABLE IV 
MAC VARIANTS RECOMMENDED IN DRAFT OF IEC 62351-6:2020 
S.No MAC Algorithm Hash 
Function 
MAC value 
(Size in bytes) 
1 HMAC-SHA256-80 SHA-256 10 
2 HMAC-SHA256-128 SHA-256 16 
3 HMAC-SHA256-256 SHA-256 32 
4 AES-GMAC-64 - 8 
5 AES-GMAC-128 - 16 
 
When using the MAC algorithms for authenticating the 
GOOSE/SV, the DS is replaced by MAC value in the 
“Extension” field of extended GOOSE/SV frame. The 
structure of the “Extension” field appended to the GOOSE/SV 
frame is shown in the Fig. 7.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Structure of the “Extension” field. 
 
The average computational processing times and size of 
secure GOOSE messages for different MAC algorithms are 
listed in Table V. The communication delays for exchanging 
secure GOOSE messages based on different MAC algorithms 
in a typical substation communication network obtained 
through network simulator is also given in Table V. It can be 
noticed that, End-to-End (E2E) delays (including 
communication and computational delays) for secure GOOSE 
messages employing any variants of MAC algorithms is less 
than 3 ms requirements. Hence, MAC algorithms can be 
successfully applied to both GOOSE and SV messages. 
However, one of the drawbacks of MAC algorithms is 
requirement of pre-shared keys. Future research pertaining to 
safe distribution of keys or proposing of new algorithms 
without the need of pre-shared keys can be investigated. Table 
VI presents the comparison of security measures specified in 
IEC 62351-6:2007 and draft of IEC 62351-6:2020 standards. 
Considering that GOOSE messages have a strict time 
delivery requirement of 3 ms, IEC 62351-1 stipulates that 
encryption algorithms should not be applied [9]. The 
reasoning is that processing times for encryption of GOOSE 
messages would be high with the limited computation capacity 
of the IEDs. However, with the extension of IEC 61850’s use 
beyond SAS to power utility automation such as DERs [25], 
Virtual Power Plants [42], energy management [30], electric 
vehicles [59], smart meters [5]; sensitive data is carried over 
IEC 61850 messages. Generally, in SAS, GOOSE messages 
are used to carry the breaker trip or close commands. The 
confidentiality of these messages inside a substation 
environment is not a strict requirement. However, when 
GOOSE messages are used to send commands to different 
DERs for energy management or market purposes, their 
confidentially becomes very important. To achieve the 
confidentiality requirement in these novel scenarios 
appropriate encryption algorithms for GOOSE messages must 
be investigated. Also, the encryption algorithms must adhere 
to the stringent GOOSE timing requirements of 3 ms. 
TABLE V 
















80 193 0.0127 0.0141 0.0709 0.0977 
128 199 0.0127 0.0142 0.0722 0.0991 
256 215 0.0127 0.0143 0.0757 0.1027 
AES-GMAC-64 205 0.0054 0.0066 0.0730 0.0850 
AES-GMAC-128 213 0.0055 0.0069 0.0749 0.0873 
 
TABLE VI 
COMPARISON OF SECURITY MEASURES SPECIFIED BY DIFFERENT IEC 62351-6 
STANDARDS FOR GOOSE AND SV 
Standards / 
Parameters 





MAC based authentication 
values 
Performance Very high computational 
times making it unsuitable 
for GOOSE and SV 
Good performance with low 





128 bytes (for 1024 key) 
256 bytes (for 2048 key) 
8 – 32 bytes 
Security 
Target 





of data, tampering, replay 
and MITM attacks are 
countered  
Unauthorized modification of 
data, tampering, replay attacks 
and MITM attacks are 
countered 
Pros Asymmetric algorithms 
(public – private key) 
utilized. 
Low computational times and 
relatively lower signature sizes 
Cons • Relatively high 
computational times and 
larger signature size 
• No measures for 
confidentiality 
• Requirement of pre-shared 
keys. 
• No measures for 
confidentiality  
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B. R-GOOSE and R-SV messages 
Figure 1 shows the mapping of GOOSE and SV protocols 
over UDP and IP layers to create R-GOOSE and R-SV. The 
IEC 61850-90-5 specifies the security model for R-GOOSE 
and R-SV messages considering the security threats and 
functions given in IEC 62351-1. The IEC 61850-90-5 
stipulates that for R-GOOSE and R-SV the information 
authenticity and integrity is mandatory requirement, while the 
confidentiality is left as optional. The IEC 61850-90-5 
recommends use of MAC algorithms to generate digital 
signatures for APDU authentication and integrity. The process 
of authentication and integrity verification using the digital 
signatures is similar to that of GOOSE and SV. For the 
optional confidentiality of R-GOOSE/R-SV messages, IEC 
61850-90-5 recommends the use of encryption algorithms 
such as AES-128 and AES-256 algorithms. Both the MAC 
authentication and AES encryption algorithms are symmetric 
algorithms and requires a pre-shared key. The need to provide 
symmetric keys to the publishers and subscribers of R-
GOOSE and R-SV is accomplished by the concept of Key 
Distribution Center (KDC) in IEC 61850-90-5. The KDC 
provides key to the subscribers/publishers which is valid for 
given time period and also informs the subscribers/publishers 
of an impending key change by communicating the 
“TimeofCurrentKey” and “TimetoNextKey” values. 
Figure 8 shows the packet format of the secure R-GOOSE 
and R-SV as specified in IEC 61850-90-5 standard. The extra 
fields for security are added in the session header and the 
signature is appended at the end after payload field. The 
security fields in session header are “TimeofCurrentKey”, 
“TimetoNextKey”, “Security Algorithms” and “Key ID”. The 
“TimeofCurrentKey” has size of 4 bytes of Unsigned Integer 
value representing “SecondSinceEpoch” i.e. the interval “in 
seconds continuously counted from epoch” [54]. Similarly, the 
“TimetoNextKey” has 2 bytes size and is represented as 
signed Integer Value. The “Security Algorithms” field is of 2 
bytes in size, where the first byte represents the type of 
encryption employed, if any. And the second byte represents 
the HMAC algorithm used for signature generation for 
achieving message authentication and integrity. Table VII lists 
different encryption and MAC signature generation algorithms 
corresponding to value of “Security Algorithms” field. The 
“Key ID” field contains 4 bytes of value assigned by the KDC 
as a reference to the key that is in use. 
The signature field consists of the MAC signature value 
calculated for the session Protocol Data Unit starting from the 
session header to the payload as shown in Fig. 8, as per any 
one of the algorithms listed in Table VII. The signature field 
starts with tag value of 85 hexadecimal (1 byte), next byte 
contains the length of calculated MAC signature and then 
followed by the calculated MAC signature value. 
The publisher and subscribers’ of R-GOOSE/R-SV 
messages receive the keys for encryption and MAC signature 
generation algorithms from the KDC. The IEC 61850-90-5 
KDC profile is based on the RFC 3547: Group Domain of 
Interpretation (GDOI) [98] and Internet Security Association 
and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) [99]. The GDOI 
communication between Publisher/Subscriber and KDC also 
called as “GROUPKEY-PULL” for obtaining Key is 
accomplished in 3 phases:  
1. Connection establishment and authorization through 
exchange of X.509 certificates between the KDC and 
GDOI client (R-GOOSE/R-SV subscriber or publisher) 
2. Determining the encryption and signature algorithms that 
are supported. Initially the GDOI client sends GDOI 
identification payload request, to which KDC responds by 
sending the Key Encryption Key (KEK) Payload contain 
the information on encryption and signature algorithms 
that are supported. The GDOI client acknowledges these 
algorithms by issuing a Key Download (KD) payload 
request.  
3. Obtain the keys. The KDC sends the response to the KD 
payload request to the GDOI clients. 
In [53], authors present the technical details and also 
implementation of IEC 61850-90-5 and GDOI mechanisms for 
exchanging the keys between GDOI clients and KDC. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Packet format of R-GOOSE/R-SV message. 
 
TABLE VII 









0 None 0 None 
1 AES-128-GCM 1 HMAC-SHA256-80 
2 AES-256-GCM 2 HMAC-SHA256-128 
 3 HMAC-SHA256-256 
4 AES-GMAC-64 
5 AES-GMAC-128 
C. MMS client-server messages 
The IEC 62351-1 identifies confidentiality, integrity and 
authentication security requirements are required for the IEC 
61850 MMS type messages. The IEC 62351-4:2018 provides 
the security considerations for achieving the above security 
requirements. The MMS message exchange process takes 
consists of two phases: handshake phase and data transfer 
phase. The IEC 62351-4 provides support for integrity and 
authentication during handshake phase and data encryption 
during the data transfer phase. 
The security to MMS messages is provided for application 
and transport profiles. The application profile includes the 
application, presentation and session layers of OSI reference 
model. Whereas the transport profile includes the transport, 
network, data link and physical layers. 
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5.3.1. Security for transport profile: 
For securing the transport profiles the IEC 62351-4 
recommends use of transport layer security (TLS) defined by 
the RFC 5246 [100]. TLS defines a cipher suite which is a set 
of cryptographic algorithms for peer authentication, key 
exchange algorithm, encryption and message authentication 
code. The default TCP port used by IEC 61850 MMS 
messages is 102. When TLS security profiles are used to 
secure the MMS messages, the TCP port 3782 must be used as 
specified by the IEC 62351-4 standard.  
The MMS messages can have either the OSI stack or 
Internet Protocol Suite stack (IP suite), as shown in Fig. 9. As 
discussed in section IV, the IEC 62351-4:2007 (old version) 
supports only the OSI stack. Hence, in the new edition of IEC 
62351-4:2018, which supports both the OSI and IP suite 
stacks, two modes of operation of communication, i.e. 
compatibility and native mode are defined. The compatibility 
mode is compatible with cipher suites for TLS defined in IEC 
62351-4:2007 for MMS messages operating with OSI stacks. 
The cipher suites that are recommended for compatibility 
mode of operation are given in Table VIII. However, the IEC 
62351-4:2018 specifies the at minimum cipher suite 
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA shall be supported. 
Due to security considerations the first and last two cipher 
suites in Table VIII are considered as obsolete and not allowed 
any more. Similarly, Table IX lists the recommended cipher 
suites for native mode of operation by IEC 62351-4:2018. 
Further, the IEC 62351-4:2018 also specifies that all the 
implementations that claim conformance to native mode shall 
support cipher suite 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as a minimum. 
 
 
Fig. 9. MMS message protocol stacks. 
 
When the above-mentioned IEC 62351-4:2018 TLS based 
security profiles are implemented the following security 
threats and attacks are countered: Masquerading, MITM 
attack, tamper detection/message integrity, unauthorized 
modification of data and replay attacks. 
5.3.2. Security for application profile: 
The security specifications for application profile has two 
classes: 
1. Peer-to-peer security specification (A-security profile) 
specified by the IEC 62351-4:2007 standard which supports 
the MMS messages implemented over OSI stack. This profile 
provides peer authentication at the application layer during 
association establishment. It doesn’t provide any 
confidentiality or integrity check mechanism for subsequent 
data transfer. The peer authentication carried out by 
exchanging the Association Control Service Element (ACSE) 
AARQ and AARE PDUs containing the calling-
authentication-value and responding-authentication-value data 
as defined in ISO 8650. 
2. End-to-end application security (E2E security), which 
specifies the end-to-end security for the application layer for 
MMS messages over IP suite and IEC 61850-8-2 XMPP 
messages. E2E security profile provides end-to-end data origin 
authentication and message integrity during association 
establishment and also the subsequent data transfer will be 
bound to this initial authentication unlike the A-security 
profile. Further, IEC 62351-4:2018 provides the option of 
using the E2E security with or without encryption. The Table 
X list the different cryptographic algorithms specified by the 
IEC 62351-4:2018 for E2E security profile.  
 
TABLE VIII 
RECOMMENDED CIPHER SUITES FOR COMPATIBILITY MODE OF OPERATION 
[9] 
Key exchange  Encryption Hash Source 
Algorithm Signature 
TLS_RSA  WITH_RC4_128 SHA RFC 2246 
(TLS 1.0) 
TLS_RSA  WITH_3DES_ede_CBC SHA RFC 2246 
(TLS 1.0) 
TLS_DH DSS WITH_3DES_ede_CBC SHA RFC 2246 
(TLS 1.0) 
TLS_DH RSA WITH_3DES_ede_CBC SHA RFC 2246 
(TLS 1.0) 
TLS_DHE DSS WITH_3DES_ede_CBC SHA RFC 2246 
(TLS 1.0) 
TLS_DHE RSA WITH_3DES_ede_CBC SHA RFC 2246 
(TLS 1.0) 
TLS_DH DSS WITH_AES_128 SHA RFC 4346 
(TLS 1.1) 
TLS_DH DSS WITH_AES_256 SHA RFC 4346 
(TLS 1.1) 
TLS_DH  WITH_AES_128 SHA RFC 4346 
(TLS 1.1) 




RECOMMENDED CIPHER SUITES FOR NATIVE MODE OF OPERATION  
Key exchange  Encryption Hash Source 
Algorithm Signature 
TLS_RSA  WITH_AES_128_CBC SHA256 RFC 
5246 
TLS_DH RSA WITH_AES_128_CBC SHA256 RFC 
5246 
TLS_DH RSA WITH_AES_128_GCM SHA256 RFC 
5288 
TLS_DHE RSA WITH_AES_128_GCM SHA256 RFC 
5288 
TLS_DH RSA WITH_AES_256_GCM SHA384 RFC 
5288 
TLS_ECDHE RSA WITH_AES_128_GCM SHA256 RFC 
5289 
TLS_ECDHE RSA WITH_AES_256_GCM SHA384 RFC 
5289 
TLS_ECDHE ECDSA WITH_AES_128_GCM SHA256 RFC 
5289 
TLS_ECDHE ECDSA WITH_AES_256_GCM SHA384 RFC 
5289 
 




RECOMMENDED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS FOR E2E SECURITY PROFILE 
Type Algorithm 
Public key algorithms rsaEncryptionAlgorithms [101]  
ecPublicKey [102]  Secp256r1 
brainpoolP256r1 
Signature algorithms sha256WithRSAEncryptionAlgorithm 
ecdsa-with-SHA256-Algorithm 










This paper presents an overview of IEC 61850 message 
structures and the related cybersecurity concerns in detail. It 
shows how IEC 61850’s use has been extended from sending 
electrical measurements in a closed LAN to WANs, several 
LANs and sending very sensitive information such as 
ownership or financial transactions. The security 
recommendations specified in the IEC 62351 standard series 
for securing IEC 61850 communication are discussed for each 
message type. A succinct explanation is given to understand 
these security schemes and put them into perspective in power 
system automation. 
In addition to these analyses, timing performance of the 
security mechanisms recommended by IEC 62351 is examined 
for power system scenarios that use IEC 61850-based 
communication. It has been found that the use of RSA digital 
signatures as stipulated in IEC 62351-6 standard for securing 
GOOSE and SV does not meet the timing considerations of 
IEC 61850. Furthermore, performance analysis of the HMAC 
algorithm, which is being considered in the revised edition of 
IEC 62351-6, has been presented. The IEC 61850-90-5 
security recommendations for securing R-GOOSE and R-SV 
messages have also been analyzed. For an up-to-date 
discussion, the latest editions of the IEC 62351-4 for securing 
IEC 61850 messages has been described. 
This paper would be very useful for researchers to 
understand cybersecurity vulnerabilities of IEC 61850 
messages, the underlying reasons due to message structures 
and solution recommendations given in IEC 62351, how these 
solutions map to vulnerabilities of different IEC 61850 
messages as well as their practicality, in terms of timing 
performances. It also gives further insight on using different 
approaches to mitigate these vulnerabilities in a very time-
efficient manner. 
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